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Both India and China have cited maps, treaties, and natural features to support territorial claims along their undemarcated border. Neither country can make a conclusive case for its claims; nor is either likely to submit its claims to arbitration. The disputed areas--totaling approximately 40,000 square miles--are sparsely populated, are characterized by high mountains and plateaus, and are comparatively inaccessible--particularly from India. (Confidential)

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THE WEEK IN BRIEF

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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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THE SINO-INDIAN FRONTIER

The current border dispute between China and India is the outgrowth of a long period of growing tension along China's 2,400-mile frontier from Afghanistan to Burma. Only one small section--the 110-mile Sikkim-Tibet border--has been demarcated. For the remainder, the basis for the alignment is "historical tradition" in the west and the McMahon line in the east.

The dispute is over an area of generally uninhabited high mountains and desolate plateaus. Access to the frontier is difficult, particularly from the low plains of the Indian subcontinent; long, difficult ascents must be made to the frontier, where the passes are at elevations of more than 13,000 feet. In contrast, the Chinese side of the frontier is backed by plateaus and mountains generally 14,000 to 16,000 feet high, and access to the border is less arduous.

Minor border disputes have punctuated the history of sections of the frontier, but conflicting territorial claims heretofore have been important only locally. Following the occupation of Sinkiang and Tibet in 1950-51, Peiping established military garrisons near the frontier, built roads, and began surveillance of traders and pilgrims entering Tibet.

India reacted by establishing a limited network of frontier posts and beginning the construction of roads into the mountainous frontier lands. Traditional trade relationships became more formalized as China signed agreements first with India (1954) and later with Nepal (1956) by which traders and pilgrims were required to enter western Tibet only by

certain designated routes and to trade at specified Tibetan markets.

This activity by both sides, accompanied by armed patrols along many sections of the frontier following the March 1959 Tibetan revolt, eventually culminated in armed clashes along the McMahon line. In early September, New Delhi published the texts of Sino-Indian notes on the border and related issues since 1954, thereby focusing attention on the undefined nature of the frontier, the conflicting cartographic representations of the border, and the various sectors and areas in dispute.

Kashmir-Sinkiang-Tibet Sector


The China-Kashmir frontier in the northwest is an extensive northwest-southeast-aligned region extending from Afghanistan to Tibet, a distance of some 300 miles, with the massive Kunlun and Karakoram Ranges on the north and south respectively. Between these great mountain barriers lies a belt varying in width from about 50 miles in the west to about 150 miles at the Tibetan border. There are no permanent settlements, and only in a few valleys is forage sufficient to attract nomads.

Both Chinese Nationalist and Communist maps show a border generally following the crest of the Karakoram Mountains. On the latest official Indian and Pakistani maps, the border from Afghanistan to the Karakoram Pass agrees in general with the Chinese version. Farther east the boundary alignments differ markedly, with Indian maps showing a boundary following, in part, the crest of the Kunluns to about 80°20'E;

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from where the line passes southwestward across the Aksai Chin area and joins the Chinese version of the border near the Indus River.

For the location of the border segment east of the Karakoram Pass, Indian offi-

cials apparently have advanced the watershed principle as the chief criterion. The Aksai Chin area, however, consists of a series of interior-drainage basins with circular watersheds, which are nearly meaningless for boundary marking. Soviet maps and the 1953 Survey

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of Pakistan Political Map show a boundary between the Chinese and Indian versions but somewhat closer to the Chinese.

Aksai Chin Area

The dispute over the desolate Aksai Chin area involves about 10,000 square miles of uninhabited plateau generally above 16,000 feet. Fuel, fodder, and drinking water are difficult to find. In 1958 an Indian patrol sent to investigate the road built by the Chinese the previous year between Sinkiang and Tibet was detained, and in July 1959 another Indian patrol was held. In October patrol clashes occurred to the south, with a number of casualties.

The Indians maintain that the 1842 treaty between Kashmir and Tibet, following Kashmiri annexation of Ladakh, established the fact that the border in this area was "well known," the treaty stating in part that "the boundaries of Ladakh and its surroundings (have been) fixed from ancient time." Since a Tibetan with Chinese rank signed the treaty and the Emperor of China was nominally included as one of the negotiating parties, the Indians argue that China has accepted the "old, established frontier."

Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai has denied that China was a party to the 1842 treaty. He agrees that there is a "customary line derived from historical tradition" separating Ladakh from China, but he insists that the border shown on Chinese maps--past and present--correctly reflects this tradition. The lack of population and administration in the Aksai Chin tentatively suggests that the 1842 treaty may not have been intended to apply to this area but only to the remaining sec-

tion of Ladakh's border with Tibet.

Although Indian Prime Minister Nehru has maintained New Delhi's claim to the Aksai Chin area, his remarks to Parliament indicate that it is in a category different from other disputed areas. On 12 September, Nehru stated, "It is a matter for argument as to what part of it belongs to us and what part of it belongs to somebody else..... This particular area stands by itself. It has been in challenge all the time."

Pangong - Spanggur Lake Area

Several Ladakh-Tibet border areas just south of Aksai Chin also are disputed, the major problems being the interpretation of the "customary line" cited in the 1842 treaty and the determination of major watersheds.

About 750 square miles are in dispute in the Pangong - Spanggur Lake area, which probably is inhabited only seasonally by nomads with their flocks. North of Pangong Lake, Chinese maps--and most other maps except those of Indian and Pakistani origin--show a boundary generally following the watershed between the upper Shyok tributaries and the interior drainage basins of the Tibetan plateau; Indian maps show a border some 10 to 15 miles to the east. At the ancient ruins of Khurnak Fort and at Spanggur Camping Grounds at the western end of the lake, border incidents have occurred recently. Chinese troops west of Spanggur reportedly are but eight miles from an Indian landing strip at Chushul.

Considering only physical geography, the Chinese version of the border north of Pangong Lake and in the immediate vicinity of Spanggur Lake would appear logical. A 1924 British-

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Tibetan conference over disputed pasture areas did not, however, challenge Indian jurisdiction over Khurnak Fort, thus supporting the Indian version of the boundary at Pangong Lake.

Demchhog Area

In southeastern Ladakh, Indian and Chinese maps vary in showing where the border crosses the Indus, with Indian maps placing the border about 20 miles farther upstream than the Chinese and most other maps. A Swedish explorer's notes (1908) indicate a Ladakh-Tibet boundary near Demchhog, roughly in line with the Indian claims. Thus far no clashes have been reported in this area, but the divergence noted on the maps suggests that the Demchhog area is a likely trouble spot--particularly since the caravan trail following the Indus Valley is one of the routes of entry specified in the 1954 Sino-Indian Trade Convention.

Southwestern Tibet-India Sector

From Ladakh to Nepal, the India-Tibet border follows generally the water-parting range between the two countries. The border disputes here have had their origin in ancient Tibetan claims and in uncertainty as to which passes are on the water divide. India cites as support for its claims--based on tradition and the water-divide criterion--the acceptance by China of the six passes specified in the 1954 Sino-Indian Trade Agreement as the only ones to be used by Indian traders and pilgrims; this leaves in doubt, however, the border alignment in other parts of the frontier.

The Chinese claim that the delimitation of the border is subject to negotiation, since frontier disputes have occurred in the past and the

border has never been formally demarcated. Although Chinese and Indian maps differ significantly only in the Nilang area, Chinese incursions and recent disputes have occurred in several other places--notably at Shipki Pass, Lapthal, and in the Spiti area.

The immediate frontier area is inhabited only during summer and fall, when alpine pastures can be grazed, the high passes are open, and the Bhotias, Tibetan-related groups on the Indian side of the mountains, cross on trading missions to and from Tibet. Traditionally, Tibetan officials levied taxes on Bhotia traders and the Bhotias on Tibetans who ventured south of the passes--a practice continued even during the period of British administration.

Nilang Area

The largest area in dispute in this sector is north of Nilang, a small, semipermanently inhabited village about 20 miles south of the water-divide passes. Indian maps mark the border along the passes on the line of water parting, whereas Chinese maps show a line running northwest to southeast just north of Nilang village. The uncertain status of the area is reflected on older maps of India produced by the British and the recent 1957 London Times Atlas, and on US-produced maps; these show a border approximately in agreement with Chinese maps. The Indians maintain that a meeting between British and Tibetan officials in 1926 produced considerable evidence of past Indian ownership of this area.

Bara Hoti Area

The Bara Hoti area, called Wu-je by the Chinese, is a small upland pasture a few miles

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
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southeast of Niti Pass. Numerous notes have been exchanged between India and China since 1954 over its ownership, and both Chinese and Indian patrols have alternately occupied the area. India claims that the border follows the major water divide--the Niti, Tun Jun, and Shalshal passes; the Chinese view presumably is that the border runs south from the Niti Pass through the Chor Hoti

tures do exist along the Chinese-claimed border.

Assam-Tibet Sector

The dispute over India's North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) involves an area of about 26,000 square miles inhabited by roughly 500,000 to 800,000 primitive hill tribesmen. The area is a belt of steep hill and mountain ter-



Pass, several miles south and west of the Indian line.

Curiously, however, Chinese maps showing the boundary delineation agree with the Indian maps. Part of the trouble arises from the nature of the water divide, which is relatively inconspicuous, with no high peaks or difficult passes marking its crest. Such fea-

rain 50 to 100 miles wide that rises sharply from the Brahmaputra plains to the crest of the Great Himalaya and associated ranges, which coincide with the McMahon line. The Chinese-claimed border generally runs along the southern margin of the hills.

This is by far the most difficult of the Himalayan

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areas to penetrate from the plains. Heavy rains continue from June through October; dense, tangled forests choke the valleys and cover much of the hill country; landslides are common, and earthquakes are not infrequent. The various tribal groups have little outside contact, beyond petty trade with one another or with Tibet and Assam. Although groups in the northwestern part of the Kameng Division have close ethnic and cultural ties with Tibet, most of the hill tribes appear to have little kinship with either the Assamese plains dwellers or the Tibetans.

The dispute over the NEFA area concerns the validity of the tripartite 1914 Simla Convention--signed by Great Britain and Tibet but not by China--and the appended convention map, on which the Tibet-Indian border--McMahon line--was drawn. The primary purpose of the convention was to clarify Tibet's relationships with British India and China. India points out that subsequent Chinese protests over the Simla agreement were concerned with these relationships--particularly the delimitation of Inner and Outer Tibet--not with the McMahon line. Chou En-lai, however, holds the McMahon line to be "illegal," since China did not sign or ratify the Simla Convention.

With the possible exception of the Towang area, most of the NEFA appears to have had no administration from India, Tibet, or China. Before 1900 the British had made pacts with the various hill tribes designed to keep them from raiding the plains dwellers; but civil administration of the area was left largely unattended. Despite the drawing of the McMahon line in 1914, almost nothing was done thereafter to extend administrative control into the hills. Until shortly before World War II, most British maps continued to show either a boundary at the line separating hill tribes from the plains dwellers--which is in

accord with most Chinese maps--or no boundary at all.

In 1943-44 the British attempted to "make good" the McMahon line, a policy continued after 1947 by the Indian Government. Administrative control was slowly extended; airstrips were built to supply outlying valleys; and, more recently, roads have been constructed linking the plains with the headquarters of the Kameng and Subansiri Divisions. In 1954, India was able to install a pro-India abbot at the important Towang Monastery, thus reducing Lhasa's religious ties with the area.

Chinese occupation of Tibet resulted in improved communications within Tibet and in an extension of Chinese military and civil control to areas adjacent to the McMahon line. After the March 1959 uprising in Tibet, several Indian posts were moved to the border vicinity--Longju outpost was occupied in April. Border clashes occurred at Longju and Khinzemane in August.

Outlook

Maps of various dates and by different authorities have been used by both China and India to support their versions of the border alignment. These maps, however, merely reflect the lack of border surveys and the poorly mapped nature of some frontier sections. As indicated by the exchanges between Nehru and Chou En-lai, Indian and British maps could be used to support both Indian and Chinese claims; and, conversely, some Chinese maps could be cited to support either position.

Neither India nor China can make a conclusive case for its position on all disputed areas; nor is either likely to submit its claims to arbitration. Negotiations over many of the disputed areas will be hampered and confused by the lack of basic surveys and accurate maps. (CONFIDENTIAL)
(Prepared by ORR)

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PART IV

OTHER INTELLIGENCE ISSUANCES

Published during week of 9-15 December 1959

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

Prospects for Iraq: the short-term outlook for the Qassim regime--factors favoring the Communists; prospects of another coup attempt by nationalist groups and chances of success. U.S.I.B. SNIE 36.2-5-59. Dec 15'59. (Sec)

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SURVEYS

Arabian Peninsula: Political dynamics. Bibliography. NIS 32, chapter V, section 53. 29pp. May'59. (Conf Nofor)

Bulgaria: Subversion, i.e., domestic and foreign activities against Bulgaria. NIS 23, chapter V, section 57, revised. 13pp. July'59. (Sec)

Honduras: Military geographic regions. Illustrations, maps, table. NIS 73, chapter II, section 21. 21pp. June'59. (Conf Nofor)

Iraq: Ground forces. Illustrations, map, tables. NIS 30, chapter VIII, section 81, revised. 37pp. Apr'59. (Sec Nofor)

Rumania: The constitutional system. Bibliography. NIS 22, chapter V, section 51, revised. 19pp. June'59. (Conf)

Turkey: Structure of the government. Bibliography, illustrations, map, tables. NIS 27, chapter V, section 52, revised. 25pp. June'59. (Conf)

Uruguay: Naval forces. Illustrations, tables. NIS 91, chapter VIII, section 82. 19pp. May'59. (Sec Nofor)

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Note:

The date on an NIS listing is the date the material was approved for use in the NIS by the producing agency, not the date of publication.

RESEARCH REPORTS AND REFERENCE AIDS

China (Communist)

China: provisional atlas of Communist administrative units. Maps, tables. O.R.R. CIA/RR GR 59-20. 1 vol. 1959. (Unclass)

Sino-Soviet Bloc

Satellite views in areas of Sino-Soviet divergence as reflected in propaganda on CPR National Day: comparison of statements by spokesmen for the ten Satellites during the period from Sept 28 through Oct 5'59. F.B.I.S. Radio Propaganda Report, Research Series RS.35. 42pp. N 30 '59. (Conf)

U.S.S.R.

Debate over reorganization of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences: nature of the reorganization proposals, development of the public debate, and lineup of scientists for and against major changes. Table. F.B.I.S. Radio Propaganda Report, Current Developments Series CD.158. 14pp. Nov 20'59. (Conf)

Planning data on the Soviet guided missile program: basic organization of the program, policy planning review and decision, operational planning and control of production and construction of missile systems. Tables. O.R.R. Research Aid CIA/RR RA 59-14. 38pp. Nov'59. (Sec)

Soviet outer-space projects and programming as depicted in U.S.S.R. propaganda, Aug-Nov 1959. F.B.I.S. Radio Propaganda Report, Current Developments Series CD.159. 8pp. Dec 9'59. (Conf)

Soviet training program for automation and computer specialists: quality, emphasis, courses offered, and institutions involved. Bibliography, table. O.S.I. Scientific Intelligence Memorandum CIA/SI 108-59. 9pp. Dec 11'59. (Conf)

State structure in the U.S.S.R., Feb'58-Sept'59: all-union and union republic government organization and changes effected during the period. Bibliographic footnotes. F.D.D. Summary 2396. 14pp. Dec 15'59. (Off Use Only)

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